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Fix, Don’t Discard MCAS/PARCC

This fall I had one on one conversations with many of our state's leaders and experts on the misplaced opposition to testing in gen...

Wednesday, December 17, 2014

NY Immigrant Child Data Protection

The New York State Board of Regents has adopted emergency regulations aimed at ensuring the recent wave of undocumented minors that arrived in the state can enroll in school.

The state has received several complaints of undocumented students facing barriers to school enrollment and has set up training sessions and issued guidance to help correct the issue. The new regulations were passed to give schools clarity on how to comply with federal law, the Board of Regents said in a release. The regulations specify that schools can't ask about the citizenship or immigration status of students or their parents, and it outlines acceptable documents schools can use to determine childrens' ages when enrolling them in school.

"The Board of Regents has enacted these regulations to protect the right of each and every child to a free public education, no matter where they come from or what they look like," Board of Regents Chancellor Merryl Tisch said “We are resolute in the belief that enrollment obstacles cannot hold back the hopes and aspirations of our children.”


New York state isn't alone in its concerns about barriers for undocumented minors enrolling in school: The federal Education Department has also issued multiple rounds of guidance in recent years reminding states of their obligations when enrolling undocumented students.

HI statewide education metrics

HIDOE will include each school’s Index points and composite scores on the school report card. The Index scores will be used to customize the supports and interventions to meet the school’s needs. Index scores will be provided for the following categories in the Strive Hi Performance System:

Achievement: The Achievement indicators measure whether a school is providing students with the math, reading, and science skills for a solid academic foundation. Math, reading, and science proficiency will be measured by the statewide assessments in grades 3 - 8 and 10. New assessments will be aligned to Common Core Standards. SY 2013-14 will be a “bridge” assessment from the Hawaii State Assessment to Common Core Standards. The Smarter Balance assessment will be administered in SY 2014-15.

Growth: The Growth indicators measure whether a school is improving students’ reading and math scores over time in grades 4 – 8 and 10.
RFP D15-041

Readiness: The Readiness indicators measure whether a school is doing its part in ensuring students are ready to move through the K-12 pipeline prepared to graduate for college and careers.
o For elementary schools, the chronic absenteeism rate is defined as the percentage of students absent for 15 or more days a year (excluding medical emergencies).
o For middle schools, the readiness indicators will be 8th grade ACT scores, which include English, reading, math and science.
o For high schools, the Index will use 11th grade ACT scores (including English, reading, math and science) and graduation and college going rates.

Achievement Gap: The Achievement Gap indicators measure the achievement gap between student subgroups and how well a school is narrowing gaps over time.
o The current year indicator will measure the current year gap, while the multi-year indicator will measure how the school has narrowed the gap over time.
o The Achievement Gap indicators will compare reading and math proficiency between two subgroups: “High-Needs” students and “Non-High Needs” students. The High-Needs category includes students in any one of the federally defined subgroups: disability, language or family income.

Saturday, December 13, 2014

Blended Learning Resources

Christensen Institute

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

By Meredith Liu
To illuminate the possibilities for next-generation assessments in K–12 schools, our latest case study profiles the Cisco Networking Academy, which creates comprehensive online training curriculum to teach networking skills. Since 1997, the Cisco Networking Academy has served more than five million high school and college students and now delivers approximately one million online assessments per month in a variety of formats. Its advanced and highly integrated assessment system offers lessons for K–12 technology and assessment.

By Michael B. Horn and Heather Staker
In an article published this week in Education Week, Michael and Heather discuss how blended learning is a scalable strategy that can break the trade-offs inherent in the traditional school design to allow teachers to reach students in ways never before possible. But for it to work, school leaders must not start with blended learning or technology for its own sake, but instead undertake a careful design process to unlock its potential.

LATEST BLOG POSTS

December 11, 2014
By Michael B. Horn
Clashes over testing in K–12 schools have grown in intensity in recent years. In some quarters, parents decry the over-testing of their children, for example, whereas others point out the need for testing for accountability over the use of public funds. Fewer talk about how important assessment is for learning—for students and teachers—because our education… Read More

December 10, 2014
By Julia Freeland
This week marks National Computer Science Education Week. Not only are K–12 schools, parents, and leaders around the country engaged in activities like the Hour of Code, but the week is also a chance for advocacy groups like code.org to highlight the beleaguered state of computer science education in America. For example, currently only around… Read More

December 8, 2014
By Michelle R. Weise, PhD
This blog was first published on CompetencyWorks. The running joke about higher education is that change doesn’t come eventually, but glacially. Much of academic inertia stems from the complicated business model of delivering higher education, not to mention the orchestration of multiple stakeholders on campuses: the administration, faculty members, trustees, senate committees, unions, and other… Read More

IN CASE YOU MISSED IT

The BLU is back
The newly expanded Blended Learning Universe—or BLU—is now live! The BLU is a comprehensive online hub packed with blended-learning resources. Whether you’re looking for a primer on the basics or want to dive deep into the supporting research, the BLU has you covered. The site provides helpful tools for practitioners, policymakers, parents, and innovators working to improve education through personalized, student-centered learning. Check it out: www.blendedlearning.org


Co-authored by Michael Horn and Heather Staker, Blended: Using Disruptive Innovation to Improve Schools serves as a design guide for K12 stakeholders looking to effectively embrace the rise of blended learning. This book is a must-have resource for educators, parents, and innovators navigating the future of learning.

Monday, December 8, 2014

Wax LRS

The analysis and visualization platform for learning organizations. You can easily connect multiple data sources and get the analyses you need, right away.

FEATURES

Dashboards

Finally, you can see all your learning data from a variety of sources in a single dashboard. No manual data aggregation.
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Timelines

We provide a quick snapshot of the volume and timing of learning activities across the entire organization.
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Score Distributions

For assessments and simulations with scores, Wax provides you with a nice distribution for attained results.
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Geo Analysis

Applications sending data to Wax with embedded GeoJSON can be visualized in our Geo Maps feature.
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Question Analysis

Analyze the quality of questions and determine if they are conducive to the success of an assessment.
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Influencer Analysis

There are subject matter experts in your organization. Discover, reward and leverage them quickly with Wax.
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WE ARE DIFFERENT

Useful Analysis

You need more than an activity stream of learning data to improve employee effectiveness. Wax is the only Learning Record Store to provide you with useful analysis and visualizations to help better understand all your learning data.

Scalability

Wax LRS provides you with the highest level of Experience API conformance coupled with best-in-class scalability. We ensure that you don't have to worry about hosting & scaling so you can focus on doing what you do best.

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Saturday, December 6, 2014

How Game Theory Helped Improve New York City’s High School Application Process

To middle-school students and their parents, the high-school admissions process is a grueling and universally loathed rite of passage. But as awful as it can be, it used to be much worse. In the late 1990s, for instance, tens of thousands of children were shunted off to schools that had nothing going for them, it seemed, beyond empty desks. The process was so byzantine it appeared nothing short of a Nobel Prize-worthy algorithm could fix it.
Which is essentially what happened.
Photo
Alvin E. Roth at Stanford University in 2012. Credit Norbert Von Der Groeben/Reuters
About a decade ago, three economists — Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke), Parag Pathak (M.I.T.) and Alvin E. Roth (Stanford), all experts in game theory and market design — were invited to attack the sorting problem together. Their solution was a model of mathematical efficiency and elegance, and it helped earn Professor Roth a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 2012.
Before the redesign, the application process was a mess. Or, as an economist might say, it was an example of a congested market. Each student submitted a wish list of five schools. Some of them would be matched with one of their choices, and thousands — usually the higher-performing ones — would be matched with more than one school, giving them the luxury of choosing. Nearly half of the city’s eighth graders — many of them lower-performing students from poor families — got no match at all. That some received surplus offers while others got none illustrated the market’s fundamental inefficiency.
Thousands of unlucky teenagers wound up waiting through the summer to get placed, only to be sent to schools they had not listed at all. And those schools, Professor Pathak discovered in a recent analysis, were “worse in all dimensions” — including student achievement, graduation rate and college admissions — than the schools the students had asked to attend.
Even more bizarre, the system encouraged safe, rather than ambitious, choices. Some sought-after schools accepted only the applicants who had made them their first choice. So students who aimed high and listed several such schools but were rejected by the first could blow their chances all the way down the list.
To address this flaw, the Education Department’s high school directory advised students to “determine what your competition is for a seat in this program"— a vexing task for even the best-informed among them.
“It was an allocation problem,” explained Neil Dorosin, the director of high-school admissions at the time of the redesign. The city had a scarce resource — in this case, good schools — and had to work out an equitable way to distribute it. “But unlike a scarce resource like Rolling Stones tickets, where whoever’s willing to pay the most gets the tickets, here we can’t use price,” Mr. Dorosin said.
Professors Roth, Abdulkadiroglu and Pathak modeled their solution to this conundrum on a famous puzzle in economics: the stable marriage problem. In the early 1960s, the economists David Gale and Lloyd Shapley proved that it was theoretically possible to pair an unlimited number of men and women in stable marriages according to their preferences.
In game theory, “stable” means that every player’s preferences are optimized; in this case, no man and no woman matched with another partner would both prefer to be with each other. Professors Gale and Shapley called the mechanism for arranging these fortuitous matches a “deferred acceptance algorithm.”
Photo
Parag Pathak of M.I.T. Credit Gretchen Ertl for The New York Times
Here is how it works: Each suitor proposes to his first-choice mate; each woman has her own list of favorites. (The economists worked from the now-quaint premise that men only married women, and did the proposing.) She rejects all proposals except her favorite — but does not give him a firm answer. Each suitor rejected by his most beloved then proposes to his second choice, and each woman being wooed in this round again rejects all but her favorite.
The courting continues until everyone is betrothed. But because each woman has waited to give her final answer (the “deferred acceptance”), she has the opportunity to accept a proposal later from a suitor whom she prefers to someone she had tentatively considered earlier. The later match is preferable for her, and therefore more stable.
The deferred acceptance algorithm, Professor Pathak said, is “one of the great ideas in economics.” It quickly became the basis for a standard lesson in graduate-level economics courses.
Of course, there seldom is much need for mass betrothals. It was Professor Roth who developed the first practical application for this idea. In 1995 he configured a deferred acceptance algorithm to connect graduating medical students with hospital residencies. Professor Shapley shared the Nobel for economics with Professor Roth for his pioneering work on the subject. When officials at the city’s Education Department learned about the residency formula, they realized that something similar might tame the chaotic school-choice system in New York.
Photo
Atila Abdulkadiroglu of Duke University Credit Les Todd/Duke University
Playing matchmaker to doctors or students is a little more complex than pairing off couples to be married, since hospitals and schools are, in effect, polygamous — they accept many proposals. But the principle is the same: Students list their favorite schools, in order of preference (they can now list up to 12). The algorithm allows students to “propose” to their favorite school, which accepts or rejects the proposal. In the case of rejection, the algorithm looks to make a match with a student’s second-choice school, and so on. Like the brides and grooms of Professors Gale and Shapley, students and schools connect only tentatively until the very end of the process.
In 2004, the first year that students were sorted in this way, the number who went unmatched plummeted, from 31,000 in 2003 to about 3,000 — still a lot of disappointed teenagers. That year, and every year since, the algorithm has assigned roughly half of all students to their first–choice schools; another third or so have been assigned to their second or third choices. (The city’s nine specialized high schools have their own separate admissions process.)
While those represent pretty good odds, parent chat groups roil with dark speculation about some mercurial trick through which a child may be deprived of her dream school. Parents worry that their children could “waste” the crucial first-place spot if they choose wrong. And they fret that a popular school will fill up with children who ranked it first, before the algorithm has a chance to consider their own, equally qualified, child.
Professor Abdulkadiroglu said he had fielded calls from anguished parents seeking advice on how their children could snare the best match. His advice: “Rank them in true preference order.”
The allocation problem has not disappeared. Good schools remain a scarce resource, especially in poor neighborhoods, and low-income and low-performing children are still more likely to end up in underfunded schools. Sean Corcoran, associate professor of educational economics at New York University’s Steinhardt School of Culture, Education and Human Development, has studied the choices made by low-achieving students, who are disproportionately poor. He found that the algorithm matches low- and high-achieving applicants with their first-choice schools at roughly the same rate. But Professor Corcoran said, “Lower-achieving kids are applying to lower-achieving schools and ranking them as their top choices.”
It seems that most students prefer to go to school close to home, and if nearby schools are underperforming, students will choose them nevertheless. Researching other options is labor intensive, and poor and immigrant children in particular may not get the help they need to do it.
But that is a political problem, and so far, there is no algorithm that can fix it.

CEDS Learning Log

https://ceds.ed.gov/CEDSElementDetails.aspx?TermId=7935

Learner Action Type Updated Element

Definition
The type of action taken by the learner.
Option Set
DescriptionCode
The person gave a correct answer or solution.answered
The person inquired about something, or sought an answer to a question or problemasked
The person made an effort or attempt.attempted
The person was present.attended
The person made or wrote a comment.commented
The person finished or ended the specified activity or object.completed
The person moved out of or departed from interaction with the specified activity or object.exited
The person participated in or underwent.experienced
The person was unsuccessful with the specified activity or object.failed
The person transferred the specified information object into a data store.imported
The person assigned initial value to the specified activity or object.initialized
The person acted with or towards the object of the statement.interacted
The person gave impetus to the object of the statement.launched
The person became completely proficient or skilled in a competency.mastered
The person achieved a successful result from an evaluation or a selection process.passed
The person selected the object as an alternative over another.preferred
The person moved forward.progressed
The person enrolled in or was recorded as a candidate for.registered
The person show a response or a reaction to.responded
The person returned to a previous location or condition within an activity.resumed
The person recorded the result, assigned a grade or rank to an evaluation of the specified object or activity.scored
The person made the specified object available for use by others.shared
The person made the specified object or activity come to an end or stop.suspended
The person brought the object or activity to a final end.terminated
The person declared the object or activity invalid.voided
Related Entities and Categories
Assessments -> Learner Action
K12 -> Assessments -> Learner Action
K12 -> K12 Student -> Learner Action New Association
CEDS Element ID
000934
Element Technical Name
LearnerActionType
XML

<xs:simpleType name="LearnerActionType">
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:documentation>Usage: Learner Action Type</xs:documentation>
  </xs:annotation>
  <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
    <xs:enumeration value="answered"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="asked"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="attempted"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="attended"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="commented"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="completed"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="exited"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="experienced"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="failed"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="imported"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="initialized"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="interacted"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="launched"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="mastered"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="passed"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="preferred"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="progressed"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="registered"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="responded"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="resumed"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="scored"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="shared"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="suspended"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="terminated"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="voided"/></xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
Changes
Changed option set.
URL
https://ceds.ed.gov/CEDSElementDetails.aspx?TermId=7935   (Email this link)
Common Education Data Standards 

Friday, December 5, 2014

Substantially more teachers are high performers

Substantially more teachers in New York state are coming to the profession with top academic qualifications, according to a new study published in the journal Educational Researcher.
The authors found that the number of new teachers with SAT scores in the top third of all test takers jumped by 13 percentage points from 1999 through 2010. In 2010, a full 42 percent of newly hired teachers came from that elite group.
The study attributed the surge to tougher teacher training and licensure policies implemented in New York starting in 1999. The researchers postulate that the more rigorous standards raised the stature of teaching as a profession and drew higher-performing students to the field.
“These findings signal a resurgence of interest in teaching in public schools as a respected and worthy career,” said Luke Miller, a research professor at the University of Virginia’s Curry School of Education.

Other states have adopted elements of New York state’s reforms to licensure and training. The Education Department has proposed regulations aimed at boosting the quality of teacher training programs nationwide.